On May 19, 2026, the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (“CFTC”) published a staff advisory letter to the Division of Enforcement which outlined a new policy for evaluating a party’s cooperation with the agency and superseded prior policies. CFTC Letter No. 26-15
1 (“Letter”) describes the Division’s approach to cooperation when pursuing potential violations of the Commodity Exchange Act (“CEA”) and CFTC Regulations. The policy is effective immediately and aims to provide clear definitions and clarity with respect to how the Division of Enforcement treats Voluntary Self-Reports, Full Cooperation, Timely and Appropriate Remediation, and Full Restitution and/or Disgorgement, and when and how the Division will find a party’s cooperation warrants a declination.
CFTC Chairman Michael S. Selig stated that the new policy is meant to “provide clarity, promote consistency, and reinforce the Division’s commitment to transparency in its enforcement practices” as well as “encourage[] prompt compliance and enhance[] [the CFTC’s] ability to police our markets in the most effective way possible[.]” Additionally, the policy is intended to further the CFTC’s goal to incentivize registrants and market participants to self-report and cooperate. Importantly, the Letter outlines guidance for securing declinations from enforcement and for recommending cooperation credit when a party is ineligible for declination. In many ways, the CFTC’s policy is similar to the Department of Justice omnibus corporate enforcement policy that was announced on March 10, 2026, by the Deputy Attorney General.
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Declinations from Enforcement
According to the May 19, 2026 Letter, the Division will not initiate an enforcement action when a party meets each of five factors. The party must (1) Voluntarily Self-Report; (2) provide Full Cooperation during the investigation; (3) effect Timely and Appropriate Remediation for the misconduct; (4) if applicable, deliver Full Restitution and/or Disgorgement; and (5) be free from aggravating circumstances, such as intentional or reckless misconduct over an extended period. These factors are further set out in Section IV of the Letter. However, the Division retains discretion to balance any aggravating circumstances against the first four factors when determining whether to pursue enforcement or grant a declination. Additionally, a party does not need to fully satisfy all five factors before the Division grants a declination. For example, a party may not have fully implemented remediation, or satisfied restitution and/or disgorgement to receive a declination. As long as the party has partially implemented remediation, or created or implemented an appropriate plan to return funds, the Letter provides that the Division of Enforcement has discretion to grant a declination in advance of full compliance.
Cooperation Credit
When cooperation is insufficient to meet the requirements for a declination, the policy provides that the Division may still grant cooperation credit. The Letter identifies two circumstances when cooperation credit may be available:
(a) If a party is ineligible for a declination because its good faith self-report does not qualify as a Voluntary Self-Report and/or there are aggravating factors present, but the party still provided Full Cooperation, Timely and Appropriate Remediation, and Full Restitution/Disgorgement, the Division will incorporate cooperation credit into its recommendation to the CFTC. In practice, this means the Division will recommend a civil monetary penalty reduction ranging from 25% to 75%.
(b)If a party is ineligible for a declination due to the lack of a qualifying Voluntary Self-Report or a lack of Full Cooperation, the Division may still award cooperation credit for any self-report or cooperation that occurs. When the party has nonetheless provided Timely and Appropriate Remediation and Full Restitution/Disgorgement, the Division may recommend up to a 25% penalty reduction.
As mentioned, the policy is effective immediately and rescinds the CFTC’s February 2025 enforcement advisory on self-reporting, cooperation, and remediation. In practice, the new policy should expand the incentives for parties to timely self-report and cooperate by increasing the maximum cooperation credit available and providing clearer criteria for parties to understand if they qualify for a declination. As is often the case with policies of this nature, however, the Division retains its ability to deviate from the stated criteria and this policy does not bind the CFTC, which maintains sole discretion over agency action such that parties will still face a difficult decision when weighing whether to report potential misconduct to the CFTC.
Footnotes
1.
https://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/PressReleases/9234-26
2.
https://www.aoshearman.com/en/insights/ao-shearman-on-investigations/us-doj-releases-new-uniform-corporate-enforcement-policy
